Ten Crucial Days
The Second Battle of Trenton
It was a mild afternoon as George Washington waited with his men as the British Army made their advance on January 2, 1777. This was to be the second time in eight days that the American Army was to face the King’s troops in Trenton. The outcome was in serious doubt.
The days since December 26, 1776 were marked by increased activity in both armies. Washington had abandoned Trenton immediately following the victory there, crossed the Delaware River back to Pennsylvania, and sent the Hessian prisoners to be paraded in Philadelphia to revive the spirits of the population. On December 27, General John Cadwalader and his Pennsylvanian Associators crossed over to New Jersey near Burlington in the mistaken belief that Washington was still in Trenton. Realizing his mistake he decided to remain and await developments, occupying Burlington and eventually Bordentown and Crosswicks. He did not have long to wait as Washington ordered his troops to again cross the ice strewn Delaware, with General Mifflin joining Cadwalader at Crosswicks and Generals Greene and Sullivan to occupy Trenton. Washington re-crossed on December 30 with Sullivan, the river so choked with ice that part of the crossings were made by walking.
Now the crisis that had precipitated Washington’s attack on Trenton came to a head. The enlistments of a substantial part of his army were to expire on January lst. The officers called their men out in the cold and exhorted them to remain a few weeks longer. Even Washington, who preferred to work through a chain of command, personally addressed his troops. One sergeant remembered Washington's words, “You have done all I asked you to do, and more than could be reasonab1y expected; but your country is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all that you hold dear. You have worn yourselves out with fatigues and hardships, but we know not now to spare you. If you will consent to stay only one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of liberty, and to your country, which you probably never can do under any other circumstance.”
Despite the exhortations, many troops left, weary of the hunger and cold. Even John Glover’s famed Marblehead men left to join ships as privateers, raiding British shipping. But many stayed and were joined by Pennsylvanian and New Jersey militiamen inspired by the victory at Trenton. By January 2, with Cadwalader’s men marching into Trenton, Washington had a little over 6,000 men of varying experience and discipline, to hold off the British.
The British, thrown into a panic by Washington’s bold attack at Trenton December 26th, pulled all their forces back to Princeton and proceeded to fortify the town. The King’s Highway, a strategic post road (Rts. 20ó & 27 today) ran through Princeton to Trenton. Rumors of impending attack and frequent clashes between patrols would keep the nervous British and Hessians under arms for hours at a time. The arrival of additional troops from New Brunswick and New York strengthened the garrison to 8,000 men, relieving some of this tension.
The able field commander, Lt. General (Lord) Charles Cornwallis, arrived in Princeton late January 1st and at dawn of the 2nd ordered his army to march along the King’s Highway to Trenton. The 4th Brigade under Lt. Col. Charles Mawhood, approxiamate1y 1,200 men, marched from Somerset Courthouse (Millstone) to Princeton to be the rear guard and the 2nd Brigade under Lt. Gen. Alexander Leslie (1,000 or more men) occupied Maidenhead (Lawrenceville). With over 6,000 trained and disciplined men, Lord Cornwallis moved on Washington at Trenton.
As the combined British and Hessian force moved through Maidenhead (present Lawrenceville) they began to encounter American pickets, picking up sporadic fire. American resistance increased at 5-Mile Run but upon reaching the Shabakunk Creek two miles further on, a deadly volley erupted from the far bank. A strong force of Pennsylvanian and Virginian riflemen (about 1,000 - 1,500), backed by artillery, had been posted at Maidenhead, charged by Washington, with delaying the British advance. Under the able command of Col. Edward Hand, the American riflemen would fire from a strong defensive position until the British formed and attacked. The Americans would then retreat to another position, repeating the maneuver throughout the afternoon, giving up ground slowly.
After several hours the British and Hessians forced their way into the upper part of Trenton at twilight. The Hessian troops were given the honor of retaking the town lost by their countrymen the week before. Hessian grenadiers and British Light Infantry charged down King and queen Streets with Hand’ s riflemen retreating before them, while under the covering fire of Rhode Island Continental’s. Washington had prepared defenses along the Assunpink Creek that runs through Trenton. The retreating American troops poured across the bridge at the bottom of the streets, brushing against Washington himself as he sat in his saddle at the end of the bridge, firm and steady in a crisis. Among the last across were the New Jersey men coming to join the army.
Having put their cannon in place the British and Hessians assaulted the bridge, directly into the face of American artillery and muskets. The American line replied with a murderous volley, sending the British back with heavy losses. Twice again, the British advanced on the bridge, some driven on by the flat of their officer’s swords. Thrown back by the weight of American firepower the British broke off the attack. One American observed “the bridge looked red as blood, with their killed and wounded and their red coats”. British artillery also hit home, ki1ling and wounding a number of Americans.
Due to Col. Hand’s successful delay, it was already becoming night. Cornwallis felt that a night attack would be foolhardy. He also felt that Washington was trapped with his back to the Delaware River and his right f1ank exposed. Although some of his officers warned Washington would flee, he declared he would “bag the fox” in the morning.
Many Americans felt the same way. To stay and fight against the well disciplined British troops would mean almost certain defeat. A retreat to Philadelphia would not allow enough time to get the army across the river before the British caught them. But Washington may have had a plan in mind all day. In a meeting with his officers he proposed they slip out of their positions along the Assunpink and, by a circuitous route, attack the British rear at Princeton. It would extricate the Americans from their current plight and, as Washington stated, “avoid the appearances of a retreat”. It was a difficult maneuver for seasoned troops, let alone untrained American militia. Washington did have several things in his favor; a spy map of the approaches to Princeton revealing a little used back road; several officers who knew the area; and the weather had changed from mild to frigid, hardening the muddy roads.
After midnight the Americans started slipping away from their lines and marching toward present day Hamilton and Mercervi1le to get to Quaker Bridge Road. 350 of Washington’s force plus 2 cannon remained behind at Trenton until dawn to keep the fires going and to sound like the army was digging in, to convince the British the Americans were still there. Meanwhile, the Americans were finding the back roads difficult to travel slippery with ice and even tree stumps in the roadway. With these obstacles delaying the march, some men would fall asleep while standing causing others to run into them. Only the highest-ranking officers knew where they were going and all were enjoined to observe the strictest silence.